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11 Introduction 
11 Historic Tax Credits 
- Federal Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credits 
- HTC Basics 
- Syndication Structures 
- Historic Boardwalk & Rev. Proc. 2014-12 
- Current Developments 
- State Historic Tax Credits 
- State HTC Basics 
- Virginia Historic 
- Current Developments 
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• Developers and Syndicators assumed a "penumbra" of protection for HTC 
syndications, pointing to, e.g., footnote 344 from JCT report on Section 
7701(o) 
- If the realization of the tax benefits of a transaction is consistent with the 
Congressional purpose or plan that the tax benefits were designed by 
Congress to effectuate, it is not intended that such tax benefits be 
disallowed .... Thus, for example, it is not intended that a tax credit (e.g., 
section 42 (low-income housing credit), section 45 (production tax credit), 
section 450 (new markets tax credit), , · · · 
section 48 (energy credit), etc.) be disallowed : 
.• r '" ' a taxpayer makes the type of investment or 
undertakes the type of activity that the credit was intended to encourage. 
Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of 
the Reconciliation Act of 2010, p. 152, n344 
-The recent action I developments has been in the 
syndication of credits NOT the generation or use of credits 
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• Section 47 allows a "rehabilitation credit"; more commonly 
called the "Historic Tax Credit" ("HTC") 
• Program administered jointly by IRS and National Park 
Service (NPS) [ thru State Historic Preservation Offices 
(SHPO)] 
• Part of Section 38 Investment Tax Credit ("lTC") 
- Pre 1986 lTC law I regulations I rules are grandfathered 
• Use of HTCs are limited by Passive Activity (§469) and At-
Risk rules (§49) 
- Under §49, non-recourse financing cannot> 80°/o of credit base 
• After 2008, HTCs are not subject to Alternative Minimum 
Tax (§55) limitations 
• HTC claimed in year when rehabilitation is placed 
• • 1n serv1ce 
• HTC subject to recapture for 5 years after placed 
• • tn serv1ce 
- HTC recapture burns off 20%/year 
- Recapture from (i) disposition of ownership, (ii) non-
complying change to building or (iii) failure to be Section 
38 property 
• Project tax basis reduced by HTCs claimed 
.dlaP1PE3r.com v 
• Certain taxpayers (e.g., tax-exempt and REITs) 
do not qualify for HTCs 
• HTCs can be "twinned" with other credits 
- Low Income Housing Tax Credits (Section 42)-
but HTC basis reduction may reduce LIHTC 
- New Market Tax Credits (Section 450)-
but more difficult after Rev. Proc. 2014-12 
• HTCs allocated to partners in accordance with 
share of bottom-line profits at time rehab work is 
completed/placed in service 
- Treas. Regs. § 1.46-3(f) 
i20% HTC 
11 Certified Historic Structure 
- Listed on Historic Register 
- Located in Historic District 
1 0°/o CREDIT 
11 "Old" building (placed in 
service prior to 1936) 
• Residential or non- 1• Only non-residential 
residential 
11 Rehabilitation work certified 1
1
11 No NPS certification 
by NPS as consistent with 
historic character 
~--------------------~~---------------------
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• Three-part certification ll•lssued regulations and 
11 Part 1: Historic li other guidance on 
Significance II availability of HTCs 
• Part 2: Proposed Work II •Audits HTCs claimed by 
(plans and specs) complies 11 taxpayers 
with rehab standards I 
11 Part 3: Certification that 
rehab completed in 
accordance with NPS 
standards 
Qualified Rehabilitation Expenditures 
Any amount properly chargeable to capital account 
with respect to depreciable real property made in 
connection with the rehabilitation of the building 
Items Specifically Excluded Included Items 
- Purchase/acquisition costs 
-Land costs 
- Enlargements & Additions 
- Soft costs allocable to 
above 
-Soft costs -architect, 
historic consultant and 
legal fees 
-Construction period 
interest 
-Developer Fee 
A 
Capitalized costs of Tax-Exempt Use Property 
[IRC§168(h)] generally ARE NOT QREs 
11 Tax-Exempt Partner: ANY Tax-Exempt Use Property 
arising from having a tax-exempt entity as a partner of 
owner is not QRE 
11 Disqualified Leases: More liberal rule for Tax-Exempt Use 
Property from Disqualified Leases; must be > 50% of 
rentable space before not QREs 
For§168{h), more than 35o/o space leased under Disq. Leases 
For HTC, more than 50% space leased under Disq. Leases 
Disqualified Lease = lease to tax-exempt entity PLUS any one of (i) 
lease term > 20 years, (ii) purchase option, (iii) tax-exempt financing or 
(iv) prior use by tax-exempt seller 
Substantial Rehabilitation Test 
• In year rehabilitation is placed in service, QREs 
must >= adjusted cash basis of building before 
rehabilitation (and> $s,ooo) 
• Measurement period for "substantial 
rehabilitation" is 24 months or 60 months for 
multiple phased project 
- Does not limit QREs to those in measurement period 
- Substantial Rehab test applied on a "rolling" basis, so 
can claim HTCs in multiple years- i.e., additional work 
placed in service over time 
J ~. 2 
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• Project Owner may elect to pass HTCs thru to 
Tenant under a lease [IRe §so( d) 1 
• Neither Project Owner nor Tenant can be a 
disqualified OWner (e.g., tax-exempt or REIT) 
• Lease term must be>80°/o of depreciation life 
- i.e., 32+ yrs nonresidential I 22+ yrs residential 
- can be <80o/o if lease is "net lease" under 
former Sections 48( d)( 4 )(D) and 57 (c)( 1 )(B) 
• Owner does not reduce tax basis 
- Tenant must amortize HTC into income over depreciation period 
(generally 39 years) 
11 Who I Tax Credit 
Investors 
11 What I Investment 
11 How I Tax Credit 
Delivery Structure 
Typically, Banks, Insurance Companies and Large 
"C" Corporations 
- Not subject to at-risk and passive loss rules 
-VERY THIN MARKET 
$0.80 to $1.1 0 per HTC delivered 
- Why would a Tax Credit Investor pay more than 
$1.00 per $1.00 of HTC? 
Allocation of HTC to Equity Investor 
- Direct (single-tier) investment 
- Master Lease (two-tier) structure 
Direct/Single Tier 
Developer 
Project Space 
Tenants~------
Leases 
Fed HTC 
Investor 
Project Owner I 
Developer Partnership 
99% 
Master Lease Pass-Thru 
Developer 
Project Owner I 
Developer 
Fed HTC 
Investor 
99% 
I 
I 
I 
;'1 
I 
1 Master 
Lease 
Space Project 
leases7 Ten ant, 
I 
I 
Historic Rehab Project Historic Rehab Project 
5 
Direct/Single Tier 
Simpler 
New Treasury Regulations on 
50( d) Income should level the 
playing field as to pricing of HTCs 
Master Lease Pass-Thru 
11 Pass-through isolates HTCs; more 
efficient 
11 No recapture on transfer of Property 
11 No reduction in depreciable basis 
11 BUT Tax Credit Investor must pick up 
HTCs over depreciable life (27.5/39 
recovery period) 
Typically "unwind" is structured as "Put" of Investor's equity interest in 
Project to Sponsor 
• Project Owner suffers forced Basis Step-Down on transfer of 
Investor's Interest under§ 7 43(b) 
• Question as to whether Unamortized 50( d) Income would be 
accelerated if Master Lease terminates 
- Consider whether this could be deferred by having Affiliate of Sponsor 
acquire Investor's Interest, and keeping Master Tenant/Master Lease 
structure in place? 
• What if Investor fails to exercise "Put"? 
- Prior to Rev. Proc. 2014-12 Safe Harbor, Developer could Call Investor 
interest 
I ~ 
11 Staged I Conditional Capital Contributions 
- Example: 20°/o At Admission I 60% At Completion-Placed In Service I 
1 0°/o Upon Part 3 Approval 
- Adjusters based on HTCs delivered- Price per $1.00 HTC 
11 Investor Returns 
- 2°/o - 5% annual cash on cash return on equity investment 
- Projected return of investment and 5%+ return on sale of Project 
- These address economic substance concern- that Investor must expect a 
Pre-Tax Profit to be considered a partner 
- Tax make-whole distributions 
11 Unwind after HTC Recapture Period 
- Investor can Put its interest at 20% - 5°/o of equity investment 
- Developer can Call interest of Investor at Fair Market Value 
.com I 
• Developer I Sponsor Guarantees 
- Completion Guaranty - Planned Rehabilitation Work will be completed by 
date certain 
- Environmental Guaranty I Indemnity 
- Operating Deficit Guaranty- Will fund cash shortfalls that may occur, 
including (before Rev. Proc. 2014-12) minimum return 
- Tax Credit Delivery {before Rev. Proc. 2014-12)- return of capital and yield 
makewhole if 
- No HTCs generated 
- For any reason, HTCs not delivered to Investor (failure of HTC 
syndication structure) 
- Recapture of HTCs 
HISTORIC BOARDWALK HALL V. COM'R, 694 F.34 425 (3d Cir. 2012) 
• 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against taxpayer and overturned Tax 
Court decision 
• Held that Investor- Pitney Bowes, Inc. -was not a bona fide partner of 
syndication partnership 
- Investor lacked a meaningful stake in either the success or failure of the 
syndication partnership I project 
• Historic Boardwalk had an immediate chilling effect on HTC syndication 
market 
- IRS promptly used Historic Boardwalk to challenge what appeared to be a 
"vanilla" HTC syndication - FAA 2012 24 002F 
• Example of the maxim -"Bad facts make bad law." 
• Staged I Conditional Capital Contributions 
- Investor made contributions immediately before Project was placed in 
service - no construction I rehab risk 
- Investor contributions not needed to fund construction costs 
• Investor Returns 
- 3% annual cash on cash return PAID OUT OF INVESTOR'S EQUITY (and 
set aside in separate account) 
- Profit opportunity limited to 3o/o fixed return 
- Underwriting I projections were overly optimistic and developer made 
Acquisition Loan that sucked up all possible cash flow 
• Guarantees 
- Owner guaranteed delivery of HTCs to Investor 
- Investor indemnified for any reduction in projected tax benefits as a result 
of IRS challenge 
• Unwind 
- Owner had right to buy out Investor at any time (DURING 5-year recapture 
period) at purchase price = NPV of tax benefits and 3% preferred return 
- Investor Put Option and Owner Call Option at FMV of Investor's Interest. 
- Payment of purchase price under Buyout Option, Put Option and Call 
Option all defeased I secured by guaranteed investment contract 
11 Owner is NJ Authority! 
- Beyond everything else, problem with transaction was that the Project was 
owned by New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority- a governmental 
authority. 
- Property owned by a governmental authority or tax-exempt entity cannot 
generate HTCs. 
- Not just a question of who gets the benefit of HTCs - but whether any 
HTCs were generated at all. 
11 PB Ownership Interest was Monkey Business 
- PB was 99°/o partner of syndication partnership in name only. 
- PB 99% ownership interest had no substance - no $$$ at risk and because 
of developer fees and related party loans, no opportunity to participate in 
project economics 
• IRS issued Revenue Procedure 2014-12 Jan. 2014 
- "The Service will not challenge a Partnership's allocations of validly claimed 
§ 4 7 rehabilitation credits if the Partnership and its partners satisfy the Safe 
Harbor." 
• Investor Does not Need Expectation of Pre-Tax Profit to be 
Recognized as Partner for tax purposes 
- RP 2014-12 based on I follows§ 45 wind energy production tax credit safe 
harbor. Rev. Proc. 2007-65. 
• But (i) Investor Must Take On Risk and (ii) No Monkey Business with 
Investor Partnership Interest 
- "No Monkey Business Rule"- Investor's partnership interest must provide 
real participation in Project economics - cannot be eroded by unreasonable 
fees, lease terms, or similar devices to "siphon" "cash flow. 
: 
• RP 2014-12 Confirms I Affirms Two Syndication 
Structuring Elements 
- Syndication through Master Lease Pass-Through 
- Investor "Flip" Structure 
• RP 2014-12 Safe Harbor expressly does not apply to: 
- Syndication of other Federal tax credits 
- State historic tax credits 
- Whether Partnership is the owner of historic building for income tax 
purposes 
- Whether expenditures are QREs 
- How tax-exempt use property rules apply 
- How to allocate unamortized HTCs in Master Lease structure 
11 Partnership 
11 Developer Partnership 
11 Master Tenant 
Partnership 
11 Principal 
11 Investor 
HTC syndication partnership 
Project owner; HTC syndication partnership in 
"single tier" deal 
Leases building from Developer Partnership; 
HTC syndication entity in lease pass-through 
deal 
Managers authorized to act for HTC 
syndication Partnership 
HTC Equity Investor 
1. Investor. If Master Lease pass-thru structure is used, Investor 
cannot also make a direct equity investment in Developer 
Partnership. 
Master Tenant may be partner of Developer Partnership 
2. Principal's Minimum Partnership Interest. Minimum 1 °/o interest in 
each material item of Partnership income, gain, loss, deduction and 
credit 
3. Investor's Partnership Interest (Size of Interest). Minimum interest in 
each material item each material item of Partnership income, gain, 
loss, deduction and credit = 5% of greatest interest 
Partnership "flip"; 99°/o interest dropping to 5°/o interest 
4. Investor's Partnership Interest- No Monkey Business Rule (Quality 
of Interest). "[B]ona fide equity investment with a reasonably 
anticipated value commensurate with the Investor's overall 
percentage interest ... " 
NOTE: NOT REQUIRED THAT VALUE BE COMMENSURATE WITH 
EQUITY INVESTMENT 
Anticipated value must be contingent on Partnership's net income, gain 
and loss. Cannot be substantially fixed in amount 
Value may not be reduced through fees (developer, management and 
incentive), lease terms or other arrangements that are unreasonable as 
compared to fees, lease terms, or other arrangements for a real estate 
development project that does not qualify for § 4 7 rehabilitation credits 
.com 
4. Investor's Partnership Interest- No Monkey Business Rule (Quality of 
Interest). 
NOTE: Exaggerated Developer Fees (including deferred developer 
fees) appear to be a principal target 
Value may not be reduced by disproportionate rights to distributions or 
by issuances of interests in the Partnership for less than fair market 
value 
May not utilize "sandwich leases" - sublease back from Master Tenant 
to Developer Partnership or Principal (unless "mandated" by an 
unrelated third party 
Master Tenant may not terminate Master Lease while Investor is a 
partner of Master Tenant Partnership 
5. Investor Minimum Contribution 
Investor must contribute to Partnership, before Building is placed in 
service, at least 20o/o of total expected contributions 
6. Investor Unconditional Contribution Obligation 
At least 75% of Investor's contributions must be fixed before Building is 
placed in service 
7. Allocation of HTCs 
Allocations under partnership agreement must satisfy § 704(b) 
regulations. 
Allocations of HTCs must satisfy§ 1.704-1 (b)(4)(ii) 
[in accordance with § 1.46-3(f)] 
8. Impermissible and Permissible Guarantees 
a) Structural Guarantees are Impermissible . No person involved in any 
part of the rehabilitation transaction may guarantee Investor's ability to 
claim §4 7 rehabilitation credits, the cash equivalent of the credits, or the 
repayment of any portion of the Investor's contribution due to inability to 
claim the §4 7 rehabilitation credits if the Service challenges all or a 
portion of the transactional structure of the Partnership. 
b) Guaranteed Return is Impermissible . No person involved in any part of 
the rehabilitation transaction may guarantee that the Investor will 
receive Partnership distributions or consideration in exchange for its 
Partnership interest 
8. Impermissible and Permissible Guarantees (cont.) 
c) Indemnities against IRS Challenge are Impermissible . No person 
involved in the rehabilitation transaction may pay Investor's costs or 
indemnify Investor for costs if the Service challenges Investor's claim of 
HTCs. 
d) "Funded" Guarantees are Impermissible . No other guaranty is 
permissible unless it is "unfunded." Guarantee is funded if: 
Money or property is set aside to fund all or any portion of the 
guarantee 
The Guarantor (or an affiliate) is required to maintain a minimum net 
worth in connection with the guarantee 
Partnership sets up unreasonable reserves (more than 12 months of 
reasonable expected operating expenses) 
I ~ 
8. Impermissible and Permissible Guarantees (cont.) 
e) Examples of Permissible Guarantees. Any of the following guarantees-
if unfunded -may be provided to Investor: 
Guarantees for the performance of any acts necessary to claim 
HTCs 
Guarantees for the avoidance of any act (or omissions) that would 
cause the Partnership to fail to qualify for HTCs or that would result 
in recapture of HTCs 
Completion guarantees, operating deficit guarantees, environmental 
indemnities, and financial covenants 
Issue with permissible guarantees is finding appropriate measure of 
damages (without turning permissible guarantee into impermissible) 
9. Unwind Mechanisms- Investor Put OK; No Call 
a) Put Option. Investor may have option to require the purchase or 
redemption of Investor's partnership interest 
No minimum purchase I redemption price 
Purchase I redemption price cannot be more than FMV of Investor's 
partnership interest at time of exercise 
b) NO CALL OPTION. No Principal or the Partnership may have a call 
option to purchase or redeem Investor's partnership interest 
Not even an FMV call option 
Preclusion of call option is different from Wind Energy Safe Harbor 
(Rev. Proc. 2007 -65) and tax law generally 
• Deals are Getting Done 
BUT all the kinks HAVE NOT been worked out 
Investors Require Deals Comply with Safe Harbor 
• More Conservative Positions Taken on Tax Issues 
Investors no longer receive structural guarantees /protection 
Internalizing tax risks previously borne by Owner/Developer 
Examples: 
Developer Fees getting smaller, paid sooner 
No assumption of Deferred Devel. Fee by Master Tenant 
• More Investor $$$ Contributed Early On 
More than 20% to create cushion on minimum contribution 
Contributed well before Building being placed in service 
• Fairness Opinions Required for all Fees and Related Party 
Economic Arrangements 
Required for attorneys to give tax opinion -that transaction complies 
with RP 2014-12 
In particular, Developer Fees, Master Lease Rents and Intercompany 
Debt 
• "Twinning" HTC equity investment with NMTC 
- RP 2014-12 precludes Investor from holding an equity investment in 
Developer Partnership. Typical NMTC twinned structure involves direct 
and indirect ownership. 
• Structuring guarantees 
- What is the appropriate measure of damages, in the face of RP 2014-12 
prohibition on guaranteed return? 
• What Opinions does Developer Partnership's tax counsel 
give? 
- Transaction complies with RP 2014-12? 
- Investor will be respected as a partner outside of RP 2014-12? 
• Fairness Opinions on Related Party Transactions 
- Who gives, and what do they need to cover/include? 
• Prior to 50( d) Regulations in 2016, Master Tenant in 
Master Lease pass-through structure would (in lieu of 
basis reduction) amortize HTCs into income over 
recovery period of property ("50( d) Income") 
- Former IRC Section 48(d)(5)(A) 
• Where Master Tenant was itself a partnership, 50( d) 
Income would be allocated 99% to Tax Credit Investor. 
- Tax Credit Investor did not decrease basis of its partnership interest by 
HTCs allocated to it 
- Allocation of 50( d) Income would increase Tax Credit Investor's basis in 
its partnership interest 
• Upon "exit" from Master Tenant partnership (presumably, 
under a put arrangement), (i) exit transaction was 
structured to avoid accelerating 50( d) Income and (ii) Tax 
Credit Investor would recognize a loss. 
• On July 22, 2016, the IRS issued temporary Treasury 
Regulations governing inclusion of 50( d) Income 
- Treas. Regs. §1.150-1 T, "Income Inclusion When Lessee Treated as 
Having Acquired Investment Credit Property" 
• New 50( d) Regulations treat 50( d) Income as a partner 
item recognized outside of the partnership 
- 50( d) Income does not increase Tax Credit Investor's basis in its 
partnership interest. 
- Tax Credit Investor must pick up 50( d) Income over recovery period for 
the historic rehab property 
• Tax Credit Investor may elect to accelerate unamortized 
50( d) Income in the taxable year it disposes of its 
partnership interest. 
• 50( d) Regulations apply to property placed in service on 
or after September 19, 2016. 
- 50( d) Regulations do not include express protection/ 
grandfathering for property placed in service before September19, 
2016. 
- Possibility of IRS challenging existing HTC syndication 
transactions using the Master Lease structure 
• 50( d) Regulations do not address whether unamortized 
50( d) Income is affected by (accelerated on) termination 
of Master Lease. 
• Issues around extent of Owner/Developer's exposure 
under tax credit guaranties (deals prior to Rev. Proc. 2014-12). 
- Issue is whether literal language of tax credit guaranty covers inclusion of 
SO( d) Income under SO( d) Regulations. 
• Pricing on HTC syndications has dropped to reflect 
increased tax cost to Tax Credit Investor 
- Prior to 50( d) Regulations: $0.95 to $1.10 per $1.00 HTC 
- After 50( d) Regulations: $0.85 to $0.95 per $1.00 HTC 
• Consideration being given by Tax Credit Investors 
whether to structure new transactions using Single Tier 
(rather than Master Lease) structure 
- SO( d) Regulations effectively eliminated pricing premium for Master Lease 
structure . 
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11 Currently, about 37 States have separate State Historic 
Tax Credit (SHTC) Programs 
- See list on Novogradac website: 
http://www. novoco.com/historic/htc/state _programs. ph p 
11 Each SHTC is unique; will not get into particulars; address 
here Federal income tax treatment of SHTC 
11 Much of the recent authority/developments have come out 
of other State Tax Credits 
- Conservation easement credit 
- Charitable contribution tax credit 
- Venture capital tax credit 
- Brownsfield tax credit 
KEY FEATURES I CHARACTERISTICS 
• Nontransferable vs. Transferable I Certificated 
- Can SHTCs be transferred by Property Owner that rehabs the building? 
- Some States provide for transferable SHTC certificates 
• How are SHTCs allocated to owners in pass-thru? 
- Several programs permit SHTCs to be specially allocated to partners (apart 
from Federal allocation rules) 
- Special allocations may make SHTCs effectively transferable 
• Nonrefundable I Refundable 
- Does SHTC only reduce State tax liability, or can Taxpayer receive cash 
refund (to extent credit > tax liability)? 
PROPERTY OWNER I ORIGINAL HOLDER TREATMENT 
• Receipt of SHTC is not a taxable event. SHTC is treated 
as reduction (or potential reduction) in taxpayer's State tax 
liability, not payment of cash or property. Use of SHTC 
simply reduces State tax deduction under§164(a). 
• Transferability does not change treatment of SHTC as 
potential reduction to State tax liability. 
• Receipt of refundable SHTC generates income, to the 
extent of excess of (i) SHTC over (ii) current State tax 
liability and prior State Taxes paid for which not Federal 
tax benefit received (Tax Benefit Rule). 
PROPERTY OWNER/ ORIGINAL HOLDER TREATMENT (CONT.) 
• Transferable SHTC is not "property" on grant, but 
becomes "property" both to Property Owner/Seller and to 
Purchaser on transfer/sale. 
• Transfer of SHTC for value is sale of property 
under§1 001. Taxpayer who initially receives SHTC and 
transfers for value recognizes gain I loss from disposition 
of property (SHTC). 
PURCHASER TREATMENT 
11 Purchase price paid for transferable SHTC is not payment of 
tax under §164(a). Purchaser has cost basis in purchased 
property ( SHTC). 
11 Upon use of SHTC to reduce state tax liability: 
- Purchaser recognizes §1 001 gain/loss from disposition of property 
(SHTC) to satisfy state tax liability. 
- Purchaser entitled to§164(a) state tax deduction for payment made 
(amount of SHTC). 
Partial List of Authorities on Fed. Tax Treatment of State Tax Credits 
11 Snyder v. U.S., 894 F.2d 1337 (6th 
Cir. 1990) 
11 2011 Coordinated Issue Paper on 
State and Local Tax Incentives 
11 Tempel v. Com'r, 136 T.C. 341 (2011) 11 CCA 2001-26-005 
11 McNeil v. Com'r, T.C. Memo 2011-
109 
11 Maines v. Com'r, 144 T.C. 123 
(2015) 
11 Rev. Ru I. 79-315 
II CCA 2011-05-010 
II CCA 2011-47-024 
11 IRS Settlement Guide- New York 
State Qualified Empire Zone Credit 
(April 4, 2013) 
II CCA 2002-11-042 
II PLR 2003-48-002 
II CCA 2004-45-046 
II CCA 2007-04-028 & 
CCA 2007-04-030 
II PLR 2009-51-024 
TEMPEL V. COM'R, 136 T.C. 341 (2011 ), aff'd Esgar Corp. v. Com'r., 
744 F3d 648 (CA10, 317/2014) 
• Transferable State Tax Credit from donation of 
conservation easement. 
• State Tax Credit is Capital Asset 
• Taxpayer has $0 basis in State Tax Credit 
- Costs of conservation easement capitalized into property, not 
credit 
• Holding Period begins on grant of State Tax Credit 
BOTTOM LINE: Taxpayer recognizes short-term capital gain 
on sale == full sale price of State Tax Credit. 
_______ -·· ____________________ -· 144 T.C. 123 (2015) 
11 Various New York State EZ Credits - Real Property Tax Credit, 
Investment Credit and Wage Credit. 
11 NY State law treated credits as "overpayments" against Taxpayer's NY 
income tax (regardless of nature of NY tax) 
11 EZ Investment Credit and EZ Wage Credit were refundable. 
- Portion that only reduced NY state tax liability was not income 
- Excess (refundable portion) generated taxable income 
11 EZ Property Tax Credit were also refundable. 
- Portion that only reduced NY state tax liability was not income 
- Refundable portion generated taxable income to the extent previously 
deducted (under Tax Benefit Rule) 
1. METHODS FOR DELIVERING STATE TAX CREDIT {State Law) 
a. Outright Sale -Transferable State Tax Credits 
b. Allocation to Tax Credit Investor through partnership 
structure 
- Could also be an S corporation I shareholder 
2. FEDERAL INCOME TAX CHARACTERIZATION 
Sale Tax Credits that are delivered through partnership 
allocation to Tax Credit Investor 
for Federal Income Tax purposes 
ALLOCATION 
a. Original holder (Partnership) 
receives non-taxable capital 
contribution 
b. Tax Credit Investor acquires (i) 
partnership interest and (ii) 
allocation of State Tax Credits 
SALE 
a. Original holder (Partnership) 
sells property and realizes 
capital gain (typically short 
term) 
b. Purchaser purchases property 
that is used to satisfy State Tax 
liability 
I 
(A) {B) (C) 
Allocated Purchased Purchased 
1 Contribution I Purchase Price 
2 State Tax Credit $1.00 $1.00 $1.00 
3 Increase to Federal Tax--
(reduction to Section 164 Deduction} - p~ d 
4 Subtotal $0.10 $0.10 
5 Increase to Federal Tax --
Gain on Use of Credit $0.00 
6 Section 164 Deduction $0.00 $0.35 $0.35 
7 Net Benefit to Investor $0.10 $0.29 $0.10 
What about loss on sale of P /S/1? :;»:;»:;» . . . 
I 
(A) (B) (C) 
Allocated Purchased Purchased 
1 Contribution I Purchase Price $0.55 $0.55 $0.84 
2 Fed & State Income Taxes (@40%) $0.00 
3 Net Syndication I Sale Proceeds $0.55 $0.33 $0.50 
1. Is Tax Credit Investor a ''? f1 • 
''''''CCY'c,'r'c,<=x<<<'<'<'''','''''',''''"'",'''''',"''''''' 
a) Tension between (i) Tax Credit Investor's objectives - only 
to "buy" State Tax Credits- and (ii) requirements of being 
recognized as a partner for federal income tax purposes 
b) This was the issue in Historic Boardwalk Hall (but involved 
Federal historic tax credits) 
2. Is syndication transaction properly treated as a 
under Section 707? 
'''''"' ,,,,,,, ',''''''=,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
a) Regardless of whether Tax Credit Investor is a partner. 
b) This was the issue in Virginia Historic 
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VIRGINIA HISTORIC TAX CREDIT FUND 2001 LP V. CoM'R, 
639 F.3 129 (41h Cir. 2011) 
• 41h Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against taxpayer and 
overturned Tax Court decision (like Historic Boardwalk) 
• Held that syndication structure effected a "disguised sale" of 
SHTCs to Investors under §707(a)(2)(B) 
• Court did not hold that SHTCs were "property"; rather, 
special allocation of SHTCs to Investors was a "transfer of 
property" under §707(a)(2)(B) 
• Another example of "Bad facts make bad law." 
11 Involved 3 partnerships ("Funds") syndicating Virginia 
SHTCs to 282 investors 
11 For every $0.74-$0.80 contribution, Fund promised to 
deliver Investor $1.00 VA SHTCs; if not delivered, 
promised refund of capital, "net of expenses" 
11 Investor received a 0.01% partnership interest in Fund 
(irrespective of amount of capital contribution) 
11 Funds made capital contributions to Developer 
Partnerships, and acquired 0.01% interest with special 
allocation of VA SHTCs. 
11 Funds invested only at project completion. 
Various Developer Partnerships II 
One-Time Cr•::::dit 
Transfers 
~~~~~~,~~ 
1.81. 
Virginia Historic 
Investors 1---------
Tax Credit Fund 
2001. LP 
---~--- -----~-
Virginia Historic 
Tax Credit 
2001. 
8 
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SCP, 
Fund 
LP 
" 
--
Virginia Historic 
Tax Credit 
200l SCP, 
/ 
,//c 
Virginia Historic 
Tax Credit FtLYJ.d 
2001., LLC 
Fund 
LLC 
~ 
93 
Investors 
// 
~----------~/~ I Mr. Gecker I ~ -,~--1 Mr. Brov;er \ 
I Mr. r·lliller I 
• Subscription agreements stated VA SHTCs allocated to Investor 
"simultaneously" with admission. 
• Between November 2001 and April 2002, Funds received $6.99 
million contributions from Investors. 
• In April 2002, Funds issued Schedules K-1 to Investors with 
promised amount of VA SHTCs. 
• Funds exercised option to buy out all Investors, for a total 
buyout cost {all Investors) of approx. $7,000. 
• Funds reported (i) money paid to Developer Partnerships for 
SHTCs as expenses; (ii) Investors as making nontaxable 
contributions to capital; and (iii) total of $3.28 million in losses 
for 2001 and 2002. 
I 
I 
• 4th Circuit avoided issue of whether Investors were partner 
of syndication Partnership (Fund). 
• Held that special allocations of VA SHTCs in exchange for 
contributions was disguised sale under§ 707(a)(2)(B) 
and§ 707 Regulations. 
- Applying §707 Regulation framework, found Investors had "no true 
entrepreneurial risk" 
- Value of VA SHTCs was disproportionate to 0.1% interest 
- Subscription documents told Investors not to expect any material amounts 
of partnership items of income, gain, loss or deduction. 
- Investor did not overcome presumption of sale under §707 Regulations 
(transfer of money and related transfer of property within 2 years presumed 
a sale). 
• SIGNIFICANT RISK of disguised sale treatment in ANY 
transaction where there are special allocations of State 
Tax Credits. 
• Issue becomes how much disproportionality can be 
tolerated before cross the line on disguised sale? 
GATEWAY HOTEL PARTNERS, LLC V. COM'R, T.C. Memo. 2014-5 
• Partnership set up in 2000 to syndicate transferable MO 
Historic Preservation Tax Credits 
• Indirect partner (HRI) borrowed $$$ in 2000, and 
contributed to direct partner (WAHD), who contributed to 
Project Owner (GHP) for Preferred Equity 
• Investor's Preferred Equity redeemed in 2002 in exchange 
for MO SHTCs 
• Tax Court ruled that two of three transfers of SHTCs did 
not result in taxable sales 
- Third transfer failed to follow form, and was held taxable 
MDFB 
(MO Authority/ 
Lender) 
HRIInc. 
(Syndicator) 
WAHD LLC 
(Developer) 
1% 
-- ------
FirstStar 
(SHTC 
Purchaser) 
GHP 
(Project Owner) 
Hotel Projects 
MOSHTCs 
Ki mberly-Ciark 
(Fed HTC 
Investor) 
HH LLC 
(Fed HTC 
Synd. PIS) 
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GATEWAY HOTEL PARTNERS I LESSONS LEARNED 
• Possible to syndicate SHTCs without disguised sale; 
transfers to Investors treated as nontaxable Partnership 
distribution under§ 731 
• Keys to Tax Court holding 
- Loan to Syndicator entity (HRI) was respected against IRS challenge that it 
was made, in substance, to Project Owner 
- SHTC Investor retained entrepreneurial risk by contributing $$$ early (2000 
contribution vs. 2002 completion/SHTC delivery) 
- Project Owner retained right to redeem Investor preferred equity for either 
$$$ or MO SHTCs - so no certainty as to either timing or amount of MO 
SHTCs to be transferred to SHTC Investor 
• QUERY: Did HRI report gain on sale of HTCs? 
ROUTE 231, LLC V. COM'R, T.C. Memo. 2014-30 
• Involved syndication of Virginia conservation easement 
donation credits to single SHTC Investor. 
• In Dec. 2005, (i) JV made charitable donations of 
easements generating $7.7MM VA SHTCs, (ii) Investor 
acquired 1 °/o interest in JV and (iii) Investor made $3.8MM 
contribution to JV in exchange for special allocation of 
$7.2MM VA SHTCs. 
11 IRS challenged $3.8MM contribution and special 
allocation of $7.2MM as disguised sale. 
11 Tax Court held Virginia Historic "squarely applied" to facts, 
and upheld IRS determination. 
- Interestingly, SHTC promoter involved in Virginia Historic also had 
prominent role in Route 231. 
11 Important because Investor lost even though it did not 
"grab the tax credits and run". 
- In Virginia Historic, Investors were partners of syndication Funds for only 4 
-5 months. 
- Investor remained partner thru Tax Court decision (8+ years). 
~--------------------------~ 
T.C. Memo. 2015-63 
• Substantially the same facts as in Route 123; involved 
Virginia conservation tax credits allocated to the same 
investment/syndication fund involved in Route 123. 
• Tax Court again upheld IRS determination based on 
Virginia Historic disguised sale analysis. 
• The decision also analyzed when the sale of state tax 
credits occurred- in the year when the credits were 
earned (2005) or when the State issued/registered the 
credits (2006). The Tax Court applied a "benefits and 
burdens" of ownership analysis to conclude the disguised 
sale occurred in the earlier (2005) year. 
11 Preference to treat syndication of SHTCs as Sale 
- Reduces risk of IRS challenge 
- Higher pricing from Investor because of§ 164(a) deduction 
11 Search for Techniques to Defer I Deflect Gain from 
SHTC Sales 
- Developers and tax advisors looking for transaction structures that reduce 
tax hit from gain on SHTC sale 
• Pricing varies by State, Investor type and structure 
11 Syndications to Individuals replaced by transactions with 
corporations having large state tax liabilities 
- e.g., banks, insurance companies 
1 . Harry K. Schwartz, State Tax Credits for Historic 
Preservation, A Policy Report Produced by the National 
Trust for Historic Preservation (last updated 8/22/2016); 
available at http://ncshpo.org/State-Tax-Credits-
Report%202013.pdf 
2. Novogradac & Company, LLP, Historic Tax Credit 
Resource Center, available at 
3. William F. Machen, Federal Income Tax Issues Arising 
in connection with the Allocation, Purchase or Sale of 
State Tax Credits, 50th Annual Southern Federal Tax 
Institute (2015) 
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11 Limited dollar amount of NMTCs 
- National allocation of NMTCs through CDFI Fund 
- $3.5 billion of NMTCs allocated for each year 2010 through 2019 
11 NMTCs earned for 
- Qualified Equity Investment (QEI) 
- made by taxpayer in Community Development Entity (CDE) 
- if substantially all of the investment is used by the CDE to make a 
Qualified Low Income Community Investment (QLICI) 
- in Qualified Active Low Income Community Business (QALICB) 
11 Program (statutory allocation authority) had expired as of 2014. 
Extended through 2019 by the PATH Act of 2015 
11 CDFI Fund announced {Notice of Allocation Availability) that it is combining 
the CY 2015 and the CY 2016 NMTC allocation into a single $7 billion round. 
• NMTCs taken over 7 year period 
- Years 1 to 3: NMTCs = 5% of QEI (15% total) 
- Years 4 to 7: NMTCs = 6o/o of QEI (24o/o total) 
• Investor reduces investment basis by NMTCs 
• Recapture if, during 7 year credit period, CDE I QLICI I QALICB fails 
to qualify 
- 1 00°/o tax credit recapture regardless of year 1 or year 6 
- BUT protection under "reasonable expectations" safe harbor 
• Use with other Federal tax credits 
- Can use with HTCs (§ 4 7) 
- CANNOT USE with Low Income Housing Tax Credits (§42) 
IDENTIFYING THE PLAYERS 
•Player •Role(s) 
•CDFIFund •Awards NMTC allocation to CDE 
•CDE I Allocatee •Receives NMTC allocation 
•Obtains equity investment from investor 
•Makes investment in QALICB 
•Tax Credit Investor •Invests $$$ in CDE 
•Receives NMTCs 
•Property Owner I QALICB •Receives $$$investment from CDE 
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Conceptual Diagram ofNMTC Transaction (w/Key Terminology) 
NMTC Tax NMTC 
Credit Investor Terminology 
makes $$$ equity 
investment; 
I 
makes sub-allocation y claims NMI'Cs 
I L 
CDFI awards NMIC:~ CDE I 
Fund - - cll;c~tto; -,I Allocatee ~--- Sub-CDE 
I 
1' 
Property 
Owner 
I 
Real Estate 
Project 
makes $$$ equity 
investment or loan 
Basic NMTC Economics 
New Market Tax Credits 
Investment 
Attorney Fees 
Sub Allocation Fees 
Annual Accounting Fees 
Asset Management Fees 
Exit Fee per CDE 
Lower fees on Investor owned CDEs 
Put 
Net Benefit to developer 
39o/o of Allocation 
$0.80 - $0.85 
$250' 000 - $600' 000 
0 - 5o/o I CDE, typical deal total 3-5o/o 
$10,000- $15,000 I CDE 
0 -.5o/o I CDE 
0-1o/o 
usually $1,000 at Investment Fund 
After put, sponsor I affiliate typically 
holds own note 
20-25o/o of Allocation 
Representative NMTC Transaction 
QEI $10,000,000 
New Markets Tax Credits 39°/o 3,900,000 
Investment $0.82 3,198,000 
Leverage Loan 68o/o 6,802,000 
Initial Attorney Fees 300,000 
Sub Allocation Fees 350,000 
Exit Fee 50,000 
Annual Accounting Fees 15,000 
Asset Management Fee 0.5% 50,000 
Put 1,000 
Net Benefit of Having an Investor $2,341,993 
(23°/o of QEI, 73o/o of Investor Investment) 
• Test somewhat simplified - no employees 
• Property must be located in Low Income Community 
- Poverty Rate of census tract is at least 20°/o 
- Median family income is 80o/o or less of statewide or 
metro area 
• Must have substantial improvements; must generate 
income during first 3 years 
• Non-residential rental property 
- Less than 80o/o of gross income from rental of dwelling units 
- Building by building determination 
• Cannot lease (or sublease) to "sin businesses" 
- farming, golf course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, 
suntan facility, race track or gambling, sale of alcoholic beverages 
for consumption off premises 
• "Active" requirement limits assets that may be owned by 
QALICB during 7 year period - no "Nonqualified Financial 
Property" 
- No subsidiary entities I joint ventures 
- Cannot have more than 5% of "nonqualified financial property"-
debt, stock, partnership interests, options, futures, etc.; implicitly 
also includes cash in excess of reasonable working capital 
• Tax structuring is significant driver -deliver additional $$$ 
to Project Owner without current taxable income 
• Equity QLICis - Subordinated Equity 
• Loan QLICis 
- Reduced Interest Rate 
- Typically used where CDE is affiliate of Investor 
- Delivers long term subsidy, but not up front cash 
- A/ 8 Loan 
- A Loan is "real" I hard loan 
- 8 Loan represents NMTC subsidy/ "soft" loan 
• Leveraged Loan Structure 
I 
' 
Basic Leveraged Loan Transaction Structure 
3rd Party 
Lender I 
Developer 
Affiliate 
Developer I 
Sponsor 
interest 
Leveraged Loan 
] 
~------------------
Property Owner I 
QALICB 
Real Estate Project 
Other 
NMTCTax 
Credit Investor 
I 
Investment 
Fund 
Sub-CDE 
makes $$$ equity 
investment for. 
NMTCsonly 
(no at-risk $$$); 
0 
claims NMTCs 
makes QEI from 
leveraged loan + 
NMTC Investor $$$ 
makes QLICI 
11 Syndication structure makes dispositions during 7 -year 
recapture period difficult 
- Must sell ownership interest in QALICB and leveraged loan 
11 Tax Credit equity ultimately taken into income either 
- As current accrual or 
- As cancellation of debt (COD) at unwind 
11 Owner Accounting Treatment- If Leveraged Lender is 
Affiliate, can Property Owner and Leveraged Lender 
consolidate? If so, 
- Leveraged Loan and QLICI Loan are eliminated on bal. sheet 
- Interest expense on QLICI Loan offsets interest income on 
Leveraged Loan 
11 What if Investor fails to exercise "Put"? 
